

## USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

Security Force Assistance in Support of Population Centric Irregular Missions

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**Project Background:** Dr. Richard Shultz, in conjunction with the National Strategic Information Center, a Washington based institute, is establishing a working group to

ascertain how to best determine the appropriate US Military Forces and capabilities to successfully manage population centric irregular conflicts in the 21st Century. Professor Shultz is working to bring together a core working group of key specialists from within and outside the US government that have an understanding of the military force structure requirements and requisite doctrine, tools, and skills needed to successfully prepare for and conduct population centric operations.

**Project Objective:** To determine how and the extent to which the US should reshape selected existing military forces and capabilities, as well as develop new ones, for the population centric irregular missions. This group will analyze input from DOD, and leverage input from academia and other US agencies to develop a strong comprehensive recommendation to US Senior Leaders on the military's role in population centric warfare.

In his Memorandum dated 14 March 2011, directing Track Four Efficiencies designed to reduce duplication, overhead and excess and to instill a culture of savings and cost accountability across the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Gates directed US Special Operations Command to develop an implementation plan to divest the Security Force Assistance (SFA) proponent mission and to focus solely on the SOF peculiar aspects of SFA. Secretary Gates directs USSOCOM to determine a course of action for transitioning the broader Joint Proponent function to the Joint Staff. In order to meet this requirement there is need for a comprehensive review of fiscal and other authorities that support SFA activities. The driving factor for Secretary Gates decision is the capacity gap that exists due to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the requirement for Security Force Assistance in support of conflict prevention exists in high priority countries worldwide.

In an effort to assist weak or failing states, Security Force Assistance is conducted from a Foreign Internal Defense and Whole of Government developing partner nation capacity approach. Special Operations Forces are currently the lead in this mission in areas across the globe.

The working group will focus on three critical missions:

- 1) Small advisory missions to assist weak states to forestall incipient instability before armed resistance intensifies; Preventative Operations.
- 2) Limited presence missions in which armed conflict is taking place; limited US forces are deployed to assist host nation to establish security and stability (Philippines, Pakistan).
- 3) Major deployment missions in which US military forces are sent to irregular war zones and serve as the main security force.

The purpose of this research paper is to assess the US Military's capacity to meet current and future requirements and recommended force application to conduct Security Force Assistance in support Population Centric Irregular Missions.

#### Methodology

- The paper will define Population Centric Irregular Missions and explain how improving partner capacity through Security Force Assistance enables a cooperative strategy to address underlying conditions of instability;
- Describe the current levels of operations and the recommended engagement strategy matching requirements with capabilities;
- Determine planning, training and operational requirements for units conducting Security Force Assistance; and
- Present predictive Analysis and recommended courses of action for shaping the military to meet current and future Security Force Assistance Requirements.

*The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.<sup>1</sup>*

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan

Although a large major theater war involving large-scale force on force conflict remains a threat to the United States military, the most probable threat to the United States is violent extremism generated by non-state actors. Due to the successes of the US on the battlefield in Afghanistan and Iraq, our military has demonstrated that it is unmatched and our coalition is unrivaled. This, combined with owning the world's largest economy, has insulated the US against the threat of conventional conflict, but has fueled international criticism and has made us the recognized target for well-organized disenfranchised groups. As the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed, we are vulnerable to networks, such as Al Qaeda, Abu Saif Group, Jamal Is lamia, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba that leverage their comparative advantage to threaten the United States and our global partners through the use of unconventional tactics.

President Obama, in the 2010 National Security Strategy, stated:

To succeed, we must balance and integrate all elements of American power and update our national security capacity for the 21st century. We must maintain our military's conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats. Our Asymmetric Warfare is acting, thinking or organizing differently than the opponent in order to maximize one's own advantages or exploit an opponent's weakness.

Defining the asymmetric threat and population centric warfare remains quite difficult. The US Government has heavily invested in modifying the security environment to address this morphing threat and best practices to address it, but writing the associated doctrine has been difficult.

The *Refined Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon*, 24 August 2005 defines "Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare" as:

*"The ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities that are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently of or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies, and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces."*

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<sup>1</sup> William B. Caldwell, IV, and Steven M. Leonard, "Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change," *Military Review*, 88 (July/August 2008), 6.

Gen. William Wallace said Unified Quest accomplished its goal of clarifying what irregular warfare really is. But he shied away from a rigid definition of such conflict, preferring to see the challenge as adjusting the mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to an ever-changing environment. The key difference in these types of wars, he says, is that "people and culture and their aspirations are part of the terrain."<sup>2</sup>

From this definition and quote, it is clear that a significant threat exists and that the people and their culture must be considered when developing plans and courses of action to address underlying conditions of instability. The goal of conflict is not just to eliminate the enemy's ability to conduct military operations; it is to win the confidence of the people in order to generate support for the accepted government and to deny enemy access to the population and to critical resources. In this environment the scope of operations must include establishing a line of communication to the populace and defeating the enemy's ideology with a more attractive ideology.

At this point, the discussion will center on the three categories of Security Force Assistance missions where the US military is currently engaged: 1) Small advisory missions; 2) Limited presence missions; and 3) Major deployment missions. We will define each of these environments and provide examples of current operations; analyze global requirements; and recommend force structure to meet each of these critical missions.

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. News & World Report, 8 May 2006

**Small advisory missions to assist weak states to forestall incipient instability before armed resistance intensifies; Preventative Operations.**

From a military perspective, in this era of persistent conflict, it remains important to be able to close with and destroy enemies and capture or kill high value targets, but understanding how to counter irregular and hybrid threats—stabilizing areas and preventing conflict, is recognized as the preferred course of action. Assessing and developing plans that improve partner nation capacity to better address conditions that give rise to terrorism, insurgency, although complex and difficult, is preferred over having to engage in full spectrum combat operations.

All governments are challenged with managing conflict between the people and their government, including managing expectations, attitudes and behaviors of people and political groups. Governments must manage this conflict by developing lines of communication with the people and then maintaining the initiative by applying resources to meet the expectations of the population through socio-political engagement; effective security operations, or through the careful use of coercion. Internal or external non-state actors, who seek to gain power or destabilize an area to fuel an insurgency, exploit Un-governed and under-governed areas by providing social services for ideological support and the establishment of safe havens to develop operational nodes.

Violent extremist organizations and global insurgents built their networks and perfected tactics within the seams of a global state led world. They targeted enclaves of disenfranchised populations and preyed on distressed governments to provide the human and physical infrastructure to sustain networked regional and global operations.<sup>3</sup>

To better address these irregular threats, USSOCOM is executing a globally synchronized, regionally executed program of country-specific and theater-level coordination elements working in concert with other DoD components and in direct support of US Chiefs of Missions and their Country Teams. The purpose of program is fundamentally Nation Assistance, or more specifically Foreign Internal Defense, to develop indigenous partners' capacity to mitigate, reduce or repair conditions that enable these threats.<sup>4</sup>

USSOCOM's program seeks to provide US Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders with tools to prevent, preempt, and respond to emergent or malignant conditions outside the timely, physical or budgetary reach of Country Teams or host nation governments. An example of this is the US Government's support to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh in response to Cyclone SIDR, November 2007. Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an integral role by rapidly establishing multiple CIV-MIL Teams to conduct civil reconnaissance and map the affected population areas. This directly fed an integrated, interagency planning effort. This team then facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance and initiated targeted civil affairs activities to extend the reach of the host nation to the affected population and limit the impact of this complex emergency on the population.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Slider, Jason, Civil Military Engagement Program, unpublished 2007.

<sup>4</sup> US Army Field Manual 3-05.40 "Civil Affairs Operations", September 2006.

<sup>5</sup> Slider, Jason, Civil Military Engagement Program, unpublished 2007.

While responsive in an emergency, USSOCOM's intent for individual nation's is the persistent assessment of areas of interest, such as the isolated coastal populations of Bangladesh, to synchronize DoD with other USG efforts to address conditions that that can transcend sovereign boundaries and cascade into regional stability challenges.

SOF, in concert with interagency and combined partners seek to: 1) target threats and threat networks, and 2) prevent the emergence or reemergence of once-defeated threats 3) generate understanding and deliver precision programs that accomplish the developmental purpose of the FID program. It is important to note that these ongoing requirements preceded the "War on Terror", exist today, and will endure throughout this "Era of Persistent Conflict."

In this context, SOF conducts and supports an assessment process that complements and is compatible with the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) *Conflict Assessment Framework: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development*. SOF Elements:

- define conditions and environment;
- describe how conditions and environment promote the manifestation of indigenous *causes* of violence, conflict or extremism; what *means* (human and physical infrastructure) are vulnerable or exploited to expand and mobilize a violent campaign; when *opportunities* exist that exacerbate population's or government's vulnerability to ideological sensation or physical exploitation;
- evaluate the threat and its capacity and opportunity to exploit vulnerable populations and their governments;
- determine most likely threat courses of action by analyzing the center of gravity (COG) resident within the population and threat organization to develop precise engagements where *critical (civil) vulnerabilities* converge with threat opportunities to satisfy its critical requirements.<sup>6</sup>

These elements support the assessment process by conducting civil reconnaissance to reveal actionable elements of complex adaptive problems, by conducting information analysis and support to the Country Team and the unified commander. SOF conducts these activities to find, engage, and analyze threats, directly or indirectly, by generating understanding of the operational problem and the conditions that host or permit the threat's presence, tactics and activities. This reconnaissance:

- detects *civil vulnerabilities* (an aspect of civil conditions and environment, which are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects – for the threat, our partners or USG inter-agency objectives);

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<sup>6</sup> Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development", United States Agency for International Development, Center for Conflict Mitigation and Management, April 2005.

- develops plans to deter threats and their networks, by reducing, replacing, repairing or exploiting *civil vulnerabilities* that expose the population to extremist influences and organizations;
- delivers programs through planned and coordinated employment of other DoD, USG and partner resources and capabilities within targeted areas, to achieve stated effects objectives; and
- conducts activities and programs as a USG influence capability.

Additionally, civil reconnaissance contributes to Army Special Operations Force's (ARSOF) persistent presence and enduring engagement lines of action. This information is shared across the country team and to facilitate and orchestrate precision within inter-agency operations, to sustain those operations and to measure progress over time.

To measure progress, SOF assists in establishing benchmarks by documenting baseline conditions and establishing metrics from which to measure progress or effects of USG action over this era of persistent conflict. This is best described as the establishing a USG common operational picture. Understanding equates to precision in the otherwise target rich context of transforming, developing and rebuilding countries that enables and emboldens threats and their networks.<sup>7</sup>

Special Operations Forces continue to support operations can also represent finding, fixing and direct engagement of threats and their networks. Like the ongoing operations and enduring requirements of Chiefs of Mission and unified commanders, potential direct engagement of threats also rely on an indirect approach to uncover irregular threats from within vulnerable populations. However, these operations are a supporting effort, where the main effort is focused on sustainable capacity building and development initiatives to pre-emptively undermine corrosive conditions that can facilitate the manifestation or infiltration of irregular threat.

Discussions continue within the USG on the role of the DoD in the era of persistent conflict. Most agree that the military element of national power will not win this war alone. Success requires a whole-of-government approach. By definition, this approach can include nation assistance, where the military element of national power supports foreign internal defense and security assistance initiatives in concert with USG diplomatic, informational and economic engagement.

SOF conducting these FID missions are making unique contribution in the era of persistent conflict in many countries within the US Pacific, Central, Southern, African, and European Geographic Combatant Commander's theaters of operation. SOF Elements are already working in support of and in concert with US Country Teams to defeat irregular threats that are out of timely, physical or budgetary reach of traditional developmental approaches.

In November of 2007 Cyclone Sidr struck Bangladesh's 3 most southern divisions, completely devastating the Khulna Division and the Barisol Division. The embassy responded by creating 2 Interagency Assessment Teams – formed in the 3D

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<sup>7</sup> Slider, Jason, Civil Military Engagement Program, unpublished 2007.



(Development, Diplomacy, and Defense) approach. This set the foundation for a Special Operations support in Bangladesh.

The interagency teams operated for 30 days, one in each division conducting targeted civil reconnaissance (collecting and analyzing information, identifying targets and mapping the civil terrain) in order to identify civil vulnerabilities and prioritize efforts in the most vulnerable areas. They did this to:

- Evaluate the Government of Bangladesh's (GOB) disaster response capacity
- Conduct Civil Reconnaissance
- Conduct immediate humanitarian assistance projects
- Inform USG plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction

Through the reach back coordination with CONUS based Special Operations units, it was determined that, WAMY (World Association of Muslim Youth) was taking advantage of this natural disaster. Instead of providing basic needs (food, water, shelter) WAMY focused on building and repairing Madrassas to generate bases of support and began providing competitive social support mechanisms to the detriment of the Government of Bangladesh. WAMY exercised freedom of movement in the most vulnerable areas – those with little or no GOB presence. To counter this threat, the team developed a plan to work by, through and with the host nation officials to raise the credibility of the GOB with the local populace through Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance proposals for Multi Purpose Cyclone Shelters for use as government buildings and to reduce future risk to the people in the event of another natural disaster. This proposal was approved and the embassy's implementation plan is being executed.

Following the initial assessment, Special Operations Forces participated in the first USAID led conflict assessment. The overriding purpose of this assessment was to develop a shared interagency understanding of the conflict dynamics affecting Bangladesh and would serve as a foundation for more effective US engagement. Achieving this shared understanding required both interagency involvement in planning the assessment and developing a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information.

Upon completion of the assessment, the team nominated a proposal through the 1210 FY08 National Defense Authorization Act- A DOD funded program through the Department of State. The nomination clearly met the program intent - advancing U.S. security interests by promoting regional stability and building governance capacity to address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism.

This interagency team assessed a gap in community based policing throughout the affected region and recommended Enhancing Bangladesh's Community Policing & Security Framework to Combat Extremism (Project Cost \$8,018,500). This program assisted the Bangladesh Police Academy to develop and sustain programs and a curriculum for instruction on community-based policing and communications operations. The team working with the Bangladesh government held focus groups to assess the strengths and weaknesses identified in the community-based policing program and this input was integrated into well-founded adjustments throughout the implementation of the project.

The program deepened the country's nascent community-based policing approach, enhanced stability, and strengthened the national security framework. The hiring and deployment of trained police increased Government's capability to patrol, monitor and provide adequate security in sparsely governed and ungoverned areas. It also built overall public confidence and trust in the Police.

The effectiveness of the program can be measured by a significant reduction in reported human rights abuses by the police based both on police records and validated by independent human rights groups. The increased presence demonstrated institutional capacity of the national police and resulted in reduction in overall crime in the geographic target areas. A second order effect of the program and the value to the US Government was an assessed reduction in extremist and terrorist activities in the target areas.

This integrated interagency effort in Bangladesh is representative of the Special Operations global effort within these small advisory missions in preventing conflict. It demonstrates continued US commitment to Bangladesh and supports the Global War on Terror in order to deter tacit and active support for Violent Extremist Organizations and erode support for violent extremist ideology.

The era of persistent conflict requires a holistic approach to security and stability. The complexity of irregular threats require the appropriate mix of force combined with the application of Civil Military Operations and partner nation capacity building that can assist friends, partners and allies in changing the conditions that give rise to terrorism and extremism. SOF understands and supports the Chief of Mission and Combatant Commander in achieving comprehensive effects through an integrated, whole of government approach to security and stability operations. The ability to work through and with indigenous elements has always been a foundation of Special Operations and will continue to be. Partners who regain the initiative to 'free and protect their society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency' are effective friends and allies in an era of persistent conflict.

**Limited presence missions in which armed conflict is taking place; limited US forces are deployed to assist host nation to establish security and stability**

The United States military has had limited success in supporting countries with limited presence missions. The critical component in planning Security Force Assistance is the host nation receptiveness to the support. In the Republic of the Philippines, the government reluctantly accepted US training support in combating terrorism and in 2002, the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines was established to assist the government to address Al Qaeda linked terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front that were fueling the insurgency in Southern Mindanao. The US support was accepted conditionally and there was a force limit or ceiling that would limit the US footprint. The government of the Philippines was concerned with these terrorist groups, however, their primary concern was the communist movement and they hoped that the US would also assist in combating this movement. This caused additional friction early in the relationship.

Special Operations Command Pacific through the Joint Special Operation Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF- P) implemented the Indirect Approach to work by, through, and with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, (AFP) to successfully conduct this low visibility counter insurgency mission. These Special Operations Forces employed a whole of government approach that enhances the legitimacy of the host-nation government and its security forces in the eyes of the local populace.”<sup>8</sup>

Admiral Mike Mullin, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2008 during a visit to the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines stated, “security is a necessary condition, but security is not going to get you across home plate. You’ve got to be able to create an economic underpinning. You’ve got to have good governance. You’ve got to have the rule or law – all things that start to sustain themselves.”<sup>9</sup>

It is difficult to change cultures and the military culture of the AFP was no exception. The established way of dealing with insurgents was a kinetic response, but this course of action was doing little to win over the population. The American leadership convinced the AFP leaders to not only fight the insurgents, but to ensure that the government of the Philippines was addressing the underlying conditions of instability that were driving the dissatisfaction that was manifested in the anti government movement. Over time, the JSOTF-P’s indirect approach showed progress and the population centric efforts to address the true underlying conditions of instability were dis-empowering the opposition groups.

The commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines, COL Bill Coultrup, explains that only 20 percent of the JSOTF’s efforts “help the armed forces of the Philippines neutralize high-value targets — individuals who will never change their minds.” Eighty percent of the JSOTF’s efforts are devoted to coordinated activities between US Special Operations Forces, American development assistance and the Filipino Government to enable “civil-military operations to change the conditions that allow those high-value targets to have a safe haven.”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Jim Garamone, “Mullen Views Interagency Success in Philippines”, American Forces Press Service, 01 June 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Thom Shanker, “US Military to Stay in Philippines”, New York Times, August 20, 2009

<sup>10</sup> Thom Shanker, “US Military to Stay in Philippines”, New York Times, August 20, 2009

The success in Philippines continues to unfold, but it is encouraging. The Basilan Model is an example of using development through the clear, hold, build concept to deny opposition access to the population and resources in an effort to stabilize areas. The AFP has established the National Defense Support Command to address civic needs countrywide and to demonstrate through the military that the government of the Philippines is committed to peace and improving conditions for its people. Additionally, they have established their own Civil Affairs Teams to address the needs of the people within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The government continues to expand its influence through the peaceful application of the indirect approach.

Lieutenant General David Fridovich, Deputy Commander of USSOCOM highlights the work in the Philippines, "We think there's a model here that's worth showcasing. There's another way of doing business. We've been doing it for years with some decent results-- not grand results, but some decent results. We think it's worthwhile."<sup>11</sup>

In Pakistan, the host nation continues to limit force packages and Special Operations Security Force Assistance operations. The military to military relationship with the Pakistan Armed Forces (PAF) is strong, but the relationship between the Pakistan civil and military is strained. It is this latter relationship that has had the greatest impact on advancing Security Force Assistance within Pakistan. While the US position is founded on building whole of government capacity, the Pakistan military would prefer to keep a separation and when they conduct civic aid, they want the people to recognize that the Army represents strength and stability within Pakistan. US Special Operations continues to work with the Frontier Corps in an effort to advance Pakistan capacity to address the underlying conditions of instability within their borders, but this relationship is in the early stages and too early to determine operational success.

Within the area of Limited presence missions Special Operations Forces should remain the lead element in representing the United States military in Security Force Assistance. Although there may be opportunity to conduct presence for purpose types missions, to conduct specific training over a short (specified) period of time, the enduring presence portion of this mission should remain a special operations lead. There is an opportunity of transitioning this type of mission to a modular Brigade Combat Team organized and trained to conduct Security Force Assistance.

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<sup>11</sup> CSM William Eckert, "Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Philippines," *Special Warfare*, no. 6 (November-December 2006): 18. At the time of this quote, Lieutenant General Fridovich was a Major General and the Commander, Special Operations Command-Pacific.

**Major deployment missions in which US military forces are sent to irregular war zones and serve as the main security force.**

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military, with the support of other nations, was forced to rebuild both the military and the national police. While both the Small Advisory and the Limited Presence Security Force Assistance missions were within the capacity of USSOCOM, Iraq and Afghanistan requirements quickly exceeded the capability of our small special operations force.

In Iraq the Coalition Forces Land Component Command's initial Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Plan was to keep the existing community police force in place and employ the Iraqi Regular Army to conduct infrastructure and border security until a permanent solution could be determined. Ambassador Bremer's early disbanding of the Army and dismissing of all Baathists from government generated a large gap in Iraq's internal security.

Rebuilding both the Army and the Police quickly became a priority for the entire military complex. The US military was unprepared to train foreign military forces and had no experience in training foreign police. The learning curve was steep. The US military was poorly manned, trained and resourced to conduct the critical training mission. Ad-hoc teams were thrown together based upon rank and availability, not based upon special skills. The programs initially lacked any standardized training and the Soldiers and Marines that executed these missions used their initiative and general military training experience to build military and community policing capacity.

Both the Army and Marine Corps realized the importance of this mission and quickly adapted and resourced these missions for success. The military quickly broke down requirements, tasks, resources required, and then developed training facilities and training programs designed to quickly build capacity to establish and maintain security. They applied the crawl, walk, run model finishing with a left seat right seat program and eventually turning over responsibility for planning and executing representatives security operations across the countries.

The Army and Marine Corps quickly worked to establish Military Transition Teams (MTTs), Embedded Transition Teams (ETTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs) and Police Transition Teams (PTTs). Within a relatively short period, these Army and Marine Corps training teams were working with Iraqi and Afghan counterparts to produce effective security forces that could defend their population and secure their borders.

The training of the host nation security forces and national police force requires a holistic approach by our government and should include the integration of our international partners to bring stability to a population at risk. The training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan will remain through 2014 and will require significant forces to ensure that both countries maintain momentum in their efforts to stabilize their countries and bring security to their people. Predictive analysis on requirements beyond 2014 is the driving factor on how the US military resources a massive training capacity beyond that.

From the analysis of the 3 critical missions identified by the Security Force Assistance Working Group, it is clear that the US Government understands the complexities associated with developing partner nation capacity. Working closely with the

Department of State, the Department of Defense continues to apply the appropriate resources cautiously to meet requirements, while maintaining small military footprints within the first two identified mission sets. Special Operations Forces continue to be element of choice to maintain and sustain the regional relationships. USASOC has expanded each of its Special Forces Groups and its Civil Affairs Brigade in an effort to meet the global requirements for small advisory and the limited presence missions. It is the requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq that require support from the rest of the Department of Defense and the other elements of the US government to bring stability and security to the people of these regions.

DoD has tasked conventional units from the US Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy to meet the Security Force Assistance training needs. The discussion will now shift to the planning, training and operational requirements that must be considered in preparing these forces to meet the unique requirements associated with large scale SFA operations. There is much to learn from the Special Operations Forces' approach to building partner nation capacity, but these missions require not only the training of the military, but also includes community policing and border security operations. These additional requirements require assistance from other governmental agencies as well as our international partners in an effort to enable the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to truly bring security to their people.

**Planning, Training, and Operational Requirements for Units Conducting Security Force Assistance Missions.**

Although the United States remains arguably the most influential power in the world, it remains limited in its capacity to influence using all elements of national power. Therefore, prioritization of resources, strategic planning, and political/strategic decisions determine who we support with security force assistance and capacity building efforts. To inform the process of prioritizing US involvement in population centric irregular missions strategic planners must:

A. Define a purpose, End State/transition plan/exit strategy-- Security Force Assistance should focus on developing and sustaining long-term (10 years) relationships;

B. Assess interest by host nation and international stakeholders to participate in military to military engagement with Civilian-to-Civilian engagement to ensure transparency.

C. Determine US, Partner nation, and international support and develop associated strategic communication plans for all; and

D. Coordinate through/with Department of State early to determine initial problem sets and to develop whole of government strategies to address underlying conditions of instability.

In 2009 the US Institute for Peace, (USIP), in a well coordinated effort among the key stakeholders actors involved in stability operations, published guidelines and attempted to define requirements for laying down conditions for a sustainable peace. While the military worked diligently to establish doctrine on the conduct of capacity building and stability operations, little guidance was available for the decision makers, practitioners, and planners that constituted the civilian side of our comprehensive approach to address local and regional instability. The application of USIP Guiding Principles enabled leaders to focus military and civilian agencies' efforts using one game plan. The End State in this complex environment requires a solution that recognizes the relationships between establishing a safe and secure environment, a functioning rule of law system, a stable representative government, a participative stable economy, and a social well being that ensures basic human rights.<sup>12</sup>

Determining specific tasks the military must be able to perform in support of Security Force Assistance begins with a scrub of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).

Security Force Assistance would be considered a subset of Nation Assistance within the context of the UJTL. The UJTL defines Nation Assistance as the Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DoD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations.

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<sup>12</sup> 10 Cole, B. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (2009).

Planners must consider Strategic Theater and Operational Level Tasks to determine requirements for manning, training, and resourcing the Soldiers and Marines assigned the Security Force Assistance Mission. From the Strategic Theater Perspective, planners must evaluate, integrate, analyze, and interpret theater information; work to enhance regional politico-military relations and coordinate; and integrate policy for the conduct of Theater Operations. These tasks ensure a coordinated USG effort. They ensure that the military operation is complementary to ongoing diplomatic and development initiatives and that all are synchronized to effectively meet specific political objectives.

From the Operational Level, planners must carefully conduct their mission analysis to include the culture of population and the capabilities/limitations of its security forces. To meet the challenges of this complex environment, the tasks listed in support of Nation Assistance must be applied through the lens of not only the United States, but the individual nation or nations affected. Soldiers and statesman should apply cultural awareness and a regional understanding to the planning process.

Security Force Assistance is a subset of Stability Operations and represents just one of the many critical pieces that must be developed in order to bring security to the people. These areas must all be assessed and responsible agencies must be identified to lead planning, training, and execution of assistance programs:

Rule of Law Assessment with Cultural awareness

Legislative capacity – Law making body

Judiciary capacity – Law interpretation

Constabulary capacity – law enforcement

Corrective capacity – confinement/correction programs

Military advising/training

Police advising/training (Center of Excellence for Stability Policing Units)

Strategic Communication/Public Diplomacy

Intelligence Analysis

Information Sharing

Logistics both from US Forces and HN requirements

Resource Management International and Operational Law

Government capacity to meet social requirements of public health, education and human rights

This list is obviously not complete and individual unit missions will dictate additional requirements. To address additional requirements this effort will focus on the Brigade Combat Team (Tactical Level) and will look at the missions within Iraq and Afghanistan as exceptions to US Policy on Security Force Assistance - requiring conventional units to train foreign military and police.



### **Strategies for Greater Efficiency**

This research group developed three courses of action for implementation of Secretary of Defense Gate's directive that USSOCOM develop an implementation plan to divest selected Security Force Assistance (SFA) tasks from SOF to the Joint Staff (conventional force). Option 1 proposes training BCTs to conduct Irregular Warfare tasks to include Security Force Assistance. Option 2 recommends standing up an Irregular Warfare/SFA Brigade Combat Team and option 3 represents the status quo alignment of tasks but shared proponentcy for Security Force Assistance between USSOCOM and the conventional force's TRADOC and the United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command.

### **Training Base Realignment Option**

In order to implement Secretary Gates' directive, conventional forces must assume the expanded role of providing selected SFA missions. This requires the realignment of doctrinal missions and the requisite realignment of the conventional training base. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as the largest stakeholder in this enterprise must lead this initiative. In concert with USSOCOM as the current proponent, the Department of State/United States Agency for International Development and the Marine Corps' Training and Education Command, TRADOC can apply integrated doctrine to effectively prepare deployable forces for the expanded, SFA mission set.

The Services have demonstrated over the past eight years at war they can adapt to changing situations and complex environments along the full spectrum of operations. It is also generally accepted that complex operations and irregular warfare will continue to be at the forefront of U.S. military engagements for the foreseeable future. This will be true as long as there remains no peer competitor and the threats of armed-group and non-state actor aggression fomented in weak, failing or failed states. It is in this context of a very complex global security landscape that the United States Army must examine new ways to proceed with adapting and organizing its forces to defend the nation, fight and win the nation's wars, and protect strategic interests while balancing strategic risk.<sup>13</sup> Realigning the military training base to train all forces to conduct SFA is not required by law or regulation, but is an implied initiative based on requirements of the UJTL and recently identified and validated requirements to bridge a capability gap and provide a whole of government approach across conventional, SOF and interagency stakeholders.

#### **People**

Manpower, and other personnel-centric resources required to transform the conventional training base in support of SFA training for all forces and agencies are an enduring requirement. This concept for transforming the training base is contingent upon receiving additional manpower or the realignment of resources within the Army's force structure and that of other affected stakeholder agencies. The justification for this COA is that the Army and Marine training base is not currently capable of providing comprehensive SFA training for the conventional Army, the joint force and interagency stakeholders.

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<sup>13</sup> Dill, J. W. *Buying Down Strategic Risk: Institutionalizing Security Force Assistance* (2009).

TRADOC and USMCTEC, in collaboration with USSOCOM must conduct thorough manpower analysis or provide a logical justification for manpower requirements detailing sufficient workload data that validates IW and separates SFA training requirements across the stakeholder spectrum. In order to thoroughly integrate all stakeholders, training manpower need not be military. However, military personnel responsible for SFA training instruction must possess unique SFA knowledge, skills and abilities. A proposed job description for military personnel training SFA tasks would encompass all of the UJTL tasks listed previously as well as the development, preparation and execution of a variety of Programs of Instruction (POIs). Finally, these POIs would require periodic review, perhaps annually as in the case of most TRADOC POIs in order to sustain IW/SFA training as needed in support of GCC requirements.

Reserve Component integration in this training base realignment is critical as much of the conventional training base is comprised of National Guard and Army Reserve Military organizations. RC personnel responsible for IW/SFA training instruction must, just as their AC partners, possess unique IW/SFA knowledge, skills and abilities. In order to enhance efficiencies, RC members must also serve as the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) for integration of RC specific competencies and equities in IW/SFA POIs.

Employment of civilians is essential to the integration of IW/SFA training for all individuals and units. DoD and DoS/USAID personnel would provide an element of continuity necessary in training organizations as military members come and go. Civilians would be similarly responsible for the same scope of work as that of the military. Civilian personnel also bring a unique perspective to the IW/SFA training enterprise. Contractors are another method to find efficiencies through altering the training base. The use of contracted manpower is commonly considered a less than optimal strategy for economizing military operations and training. In the event manpower analysis determines contracted manpower appropriate however, contracted manpower providing enterprise-specific training support, conducting training evaluation or other related services on an ad hoc or surge basis will economize the enduring or long-term delivery of IW training. The ability for the training base to surge these capabilities as needed, without the full-time employment of military or government manpower resources and the associated fixed costs, will likely create significant manpower savings.

### ***Bill Payers***

The bill payer strategy for adding IW/SFA training capability to the conventional joint training base must be based on manpower analysis studies by the proponents and affected organizations. However, adding 3% of current training manpower, across all categories in order to absorb IW training management and delivery capability will provide momentum for realignment. These increases will come at the expense of "at risk" structure aligned under mission sets found no longer valid or for which requirements have decreased. An example of this may be found in Air Defense Artillery structure, military bands and CONUS-based support and services infrastructure. Given the nature and requisite competencies of IW/SFA training, use of contracted trainers and training support manpower during surge periods as needed will enable efficiencies lost through the additional 3% increase in overall military, DoD and DoS training and training support personnel. 2) Army transfers IW/SFA trainers from ARSOF training base to conventional training base

- 3) Army cross-trains selected conventional force trainers and training support capabilities to conduct conventional IW/SFA training
- 2) Cost Analysis, Data Sources and Organizing Cost Data must be consistent with CJCSIs, HQDA directives/guidance and ARSOF precedent. USA TRADOC as Army proponent command will compare quantifiable and non-quantifiable costs associated with realignment of functions to determine the optimal realignment strategy.

### ***Facilities and Equipment***

Existing training base equipment resources are currently sufficient to enable an initial IW/SFA training capability. However, as an enduring requirement and continual IW/SFA doctrine development progress, equipment requirements must be expected to increase as conventional force IW/SFA training requirements continue to develop. Additional facilities requirements for IW/SFA training delivery capability are significant. However, logical and innovative stationing will contain resource expenditures.

### ***Funding***

Funding is a critical issue in transitioning SFA from SOF to conventional forces. Funding IW training capability in the joint/integrated training base must be through a combination of Title 10, 22 and any other appropriate United States Code (USC) funding authorities determined to possess equities in the IW training base. The proponent for IW determines this through requirements determination and analysis. This will result in the creation of lines of accounting across DoD Services as well as DoS/USAID and other USG agencies. These additional lines of accounting may then be entered into the appropriate DoD Service, DoS or USG agency funding mechanism for competition among other Service, Department or agency requirements.

### ***Challenges and Resistance***

The readiness effects of failing to transform the training base to absorb IW/SFA training requirements delivered to conventional forces and civilian organizations are significant. Conventional military forces, DoS/USAID and other USG agencies are currently untrained in integrating IW/SFA operations without SOF initiation, facilitation and transfer of authority. Additionally, IW/SFA training for the entirety of DoD conventional forces and USG civilian organizations produces impacts across the breadth of these organizations. Military organizations such as Service Component Commands and Joint Task Force Headquarters elements must interact and coordinate training and training support requirements.

USG departments and agencies must also establish coordinating mechanisms to integrate capabilities and requirements to ensure synchronization with military equities while building in the efficiencies that provided the impetus for this realignment. Stationing the IW training capability represents minimal stationing impacts to DoD when aligned with the current conventional training footprint. There are non-DoD impacts but these are addressed in the cost-benefit analysis presented at later in this work.

In addition to the tangible personnel and resourcing challenges, there are a variety of political sensitivities associated with this initiative, both military and civilian. Among the military sensitivities are the reallocation of significant resources from historically proven

SOF to conventional forces. Also, much of the realigned capability will reside in the reserve components. This will cause greater competition among active and reserve components. This also impacts the dynamics between federal government and state political forces. Further, the migration of responsibilities across DoD and USG department and agency boundaries will produce similar competition in resourcing. Stationing is yet another challenge, U.S. states with existing equities in military bases will want to retain their position and positioning forces there is likely more efficient. However, those states without current equities may increase their level of competition in order to obtain a greater share of the advantages of hosting military forces and the infrastructure that brings to communities. The Army must buy-in to this concept and assume proponentcy. This will not be difficult in itself. However, legislation assigning responsibility for IW/SFA training to the Army must be passed in order to create the forcing function necessary for the Army and Marine Corps to spend funding on this enterprise.

### **The Brigade Combat Team Option**

As in the case for realignment of the conventional training base to incorporate IW/SFA training for all forces, IW will continue to be a critical function of US global stability engagements for the foreseeable future. Creating the IWBCT is not required by law or regulation but is implied by SecDef memo directing US Special Operations Command to develop an implementation plan to divest the Security Force Assistance (SFA) proponent mission and to focus solely on the SOF peculiar aspects of SFA. Secretary Gates directs USSOCOM to determine a course of action for transitioning the broader Joint Proponent function to the Joint Staff. This implies the requirement to create a capability in conventional forces to meet the additional requirement to conduct IW/SFA. This initiative is not directed by HQDA. This COA is based on UJTL and current GCC requirements. This capability does not exist currently and is proposed to divest Non-SOF peculiar tasks associated with IW/SFA missions to conventional forces.

Manpower, and other personnel-centric resources required to create an IWBCT are an enduring requirement. Use of the BCT concept to meet this capability gap is contingent upon receiving additional manpower or the realignment of significant resources within the Army's and/or the Marine Corps' force structure. USSOCOM as the current proponent for IW/SFA must conduct a thorough manpower analysis or provide a logical justification for manpower requirements detailing sufficient workload data that validates IW/SFA task requirements (both doctrinal and GCC directed) across the stakeholder spectrum. IWBCT manpower must include military personnel possessing unique IW/SFA knowledge, skills and abilities. A proposed job description for military personnel performing IWBCT tasks follows would certainly include those UJTL tasks specified earlier as well as GCC required tasks. RC personnel assigned to the IWBCT must possess the same unique IW knowledge and skills. Their job description would be identical to that of Active Component military. DoD Civilians as well as other civilian agencies (DoS/USAID) must also be integrated as well as contractors. Similar to the training base realignment option, the use of contracted manpower in conducting or supporting portions of IWBCT tasks or providing other enterprise-specific support or services will economize the full-time, military and civilian manning of the IWBCT. Again, the ability to surge or reduce this manpower resource as needed creates significant manpower savings in the long-term.

The bill payer strategy for adding IWBCT capability to the conventional Army is to divest selected "at risk" Standard Requirements Code (SRC) force structure in favor of adding IW/SFA force structure. A Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimate of spaces from all manpower categories (military, RC military, civilian and contractors) is 3,500 total spaces.

Facilities and equipment for an IWBCT do not currently exist. The bill for these commodities is significant. However, as an enduring requirement and continual IW/SFA doctrine development progress, facilities and equipment requirements must be expected to increase as conventional force IW/SFA training requirements continue to develop. Additional facilities requirements for IW/SFA training delivery capability are significant. However, logical and innovative stationing and conformance with BRAC law will contain resource expenditures.

Funding is a critical issue in transitioning SFA from SOF to conventional forces. Funding IW training capability in the joint/integrated training base must be through a combination of Title 10, 22 and any other appropriate United States Code (USC) funding authorities determined to possess equities in the IW training base. The proponent for IW determines this through requirements determination and analysis. This will result in the creation of lines of accounting across DoD Services as well as DoS/USAID and other USG agencies. These additional lines of accounting may then be entered into the appropriate DoD Service, DoS or USG agency funding mechanism for competition among other Service, Department or agency requirements.

The readiness impacts of creating the IWBCT are significant. Most significant is that conventional US military forces are currently stretched quite thin around the world. Adding to the requirements of the conventional force will force deployment frequency up and dwell time down. This will rob the Services of the "quality of life" gains produced during the first half of Secretary Gates' tenure. Stationing will also prove significant, as it must be consistent with HQDA plans and strategy and constrained by Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) statutes. Again, there are a variety of political sensitivities associated with the IWBCT with the same military and civilian sensitivities associated with the reallocation of significant resources from historically proven SOF to conventional forces. Also, much of the realigned capability will reside in the reserve components (most notably the Army National Guard). This will cause greater competition among active and reserve components as well as between the National Guard and Reserve.

This option also impacts the dynamics between federal government and state political entities. Migration of responsibilities across DoD and USG department and agency boundaries will create increased competition for resources across those very same boundaries. Adding IW/SFA capability to conventional Army unit mission sets enhances conventional IW/SFA capability at perhaps a much greater cost than is desirable. As an enduring requirement, this strategy may prove the most expensive in the long-term as sufficient IWBCT bill payers will not likely be available throughout DoD to execute creation of the IWBCT. Additional resources to accomplish this are also not likely to materialize.

### Shared Responsibility

Like the first two alternatives, complex operations and irregular warfare will continue for the foreseeable future. Creating a shared IW capability is not required by law or regulation but is implied by SecDef memo directing US Special Operations Command to develop an implementation plan to divest the Security Force Assistance (SFA) proponent mission and to focus solely on the SOF peculiar aspects of SFA. Secretary Gates directs USSOCOM to determine a course of action for transitioning the broader Joint Proponent function to the Joint Staff. This implies the requirement to create a capability in conventional forces to meet the additional requirement to conduct IW operations. This initiative is not directed by HQDA. This COA is based on UJTL and current GCC requirements. This shared capability is the current status quo and is proposed to retain responsibility for SOF-specific SFA capability within the purview of ARSOC and divest Non-SOF peculiar tasks associated with IW missions to conventional forces.

USSOCOM as the current proponent for IW/SFA operations must conduct thorough manpower analysis or provide a logical justification for manpower requirement realignments from both SOF and conventional force structure. This must detail sufficient workload data that validates IW/SFA task requirements (both doctrinal and GCC directed) across the stakeholder spectrum. In this option, like the others, IW/SFA manpower must include Active and Reserve military personnel, civilians and possibly contractors. Funding the shared IW/SFA responsibility will be similar to realigning the training base and identical to creating a new IWBCCT with one exception. Funding a shared capability produces competition among equal requirements.

The bill payer strategy for sharing IW mission responsibility is a zero sum game. Sharing IW responsibility negates significant force structure realignments. Facilities and equipment requirements for sharing the IW/SFA responsibility across the spectrum of stakeholders must again be a "zero-sum game". Equipment is currently authorized in support of existing ARSOF IW/SFA capability. Divestiture of Non-SOF specific SFA tasks and/or those associated with providing enduring SFA from conventional Army forces requires realignment of "at risk" SRC equipment to IW responsible conventional Army forces. As an enduring requirement, equipment requirements must be expected to increase and entered into competition during Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development. Additional facilities requirements for shared IW responsibility are negligible. Existing facilities must however be realigned to meet IW unit requirements. HQDA and USA IMCOM will determine optimal facilities utilization in conjunction with stationing initiatives. Finally, the challenges associated with stationing shared responsibility are practically the same as those in realigning the training base and creating an IWBCCT, but they provides more flexibility in the number of options available. This provides a slight advantage over the first two options.

### Recommendation

In this era of severely constrained resourcing, downsizing and with Security Force Assistance Operations winding down in Iraq and Afghanistan, our research group must recommend sharing responsibility of IW/SFA between USSOCOM and conventional forces. We must not cause extraneous force structure changes and realignments. The key to conducting effective SFA at the scale the US has decided to engage, is to tailor the particular capability strengths of specific forces with their mission set.

Special Operations Forces remain the best option to address both 1) Small advisory missions to assist weak states to forestall incipient instability before armed resistance intensifies (Preventative Operations) and 2) Limited presence missions in which armed conflict is taking place and limited US forces are deployed to assist the host nation to establish security and stability.

The third scenario calls for major deployment missions where US military forces are sent to irregular war zones and serve as the main security force that clearly exceeds the capacity of Special Operations Command and requires a Big Army and Marine Corps Solution. This mission requires the Joint Staff to determine Force requirements in Depth (5 years minimum); apply detailed training requirements; and then lay out the Army/Marine Corps Force Generation to meet the requirements. If done correctly this equation can/should include Active Army and Marine Corps Units for the first 2 years and then transition Reserve and National Guard Units that can adapt their mission focused training to meet requirements for years 3-5 or beyond as needed.

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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Dr. Richard Shultz, Director of the International Security Studies Program at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in conjunction with the National Strategic Information Center, a Washington based institute, is establishing a working group to ascertain how to best determine the appropriate US Military Forces and capabilities to successfully manage population centric irregular conflicts in the 21st Century. Professor Shultz is working to bring together a core working group of key specialists from within and outside the US government that have an understanding of the military force structure requirements and requisite doctrine, tools, and skills needed to successfully prepare for and conduct population centric operations.  The objective of this Research Project is to determine how and the extent to which the US should reshape selected existing military forces and capabilities, as well as develop new ones, for the population centric irregular missions. This group will analyze input from DOD, and leverage input from academia and other US agencies to develop a strong comprehensive recommendation to US Senior Leaders on the military's role in population centric warfare.					
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